Created 11/17/1997
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Review of "The Clash"

J. Bradford DeLong


Walter LaFeber (1997), The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: W.W. Norton).

The Clash

Walter LaFeber has written a book about U.S. Japanese relations over the past century and a half. He has called his book The Clash. His central thesis is that U.S. Japanese relations have presented the appearance of partnership--that "Americans and Japanese have generally seen each other as partners"--but that this appearance has masked a reality of conflict: "they have in truth endured a series of sometimes highly dangerous clashes during their 150-year relationship" (p. xviii). At the root of this clash has been an economic conflict: "a clash between two different forms of capitalism" (p. xviii) that has generated a "century-old rivalry to decide which system was to lead in developing Asian and especially Chinese markets" (p. 407).

I do not like this book

Let me hasten to say that I do not criticize Walter LaFeber because he is a bad historian. I criticize him because he is a good one.The Clash is likely to be the best history of U.S.-Japanese foreign relations we will have for the next half a generation.

Yet his vision of American-Japanese foreign relations is warped, twisted, and fundamentally false. For LaFeber sees conflict where in reality there is economic partnership and cooperation. LaFeber sees border tensions and adjustments in which governments jockey for local positions and small advantages. He magnifies the frictions naturally created by a growing and productive relationship. He thinks they are the whole story--and so he misses the enormous upward sweep in productive economic integration and trade. It is as if someone focused on how the water level was falling in a two-foot-in-diameter tidepool, and missed the fact that there was a moon that drove the regular cycle of the tides.

LaFeber's Picture of U.S.-Japan Relations

Let me be more specific. Let me focus on the penultimate chapter of LaFeber's book, the chapter "End of an Era" that covers 1973 to 1996. In this chapter seven points are repeatedly driven home with a pile driver:

The conclusion? That"Americans... trust[ed] to the magic of the international marketplace--a marketplace that MITI and the keiretsu had long worked to fix" (p. 379); as "Chalmers Johnson observed: 'The Cold War is over, the Japanese won" (p. 384).

There is--occasionally, very occasionally--a contrarian voice: One of the few examples: "Secretary of State [George] Shultz... avoided a confrontation... if the Japanese 'wanted to pay astronomical prices for goods that are cheaper elsewhere, that is more their problem than ours... if we wanted to see our real problem we should look in the mirror (p. 380)."

Nevertheless, if you read Walter LaFeber's chapter on U.S.-Japanese relations 1973-1996, and then tried to conjure up the picture of the end-state therein portrayed, you would conjure up a fearsome sight indeed. The American economy is repeatedly devastated, (but there is no mention of any recovery). Japanese-U.S. relations are always souring (they sweeten only once, in late 1982). The major industries of the U.S. are always in retreat relative to Japan, with only the computer industry managing to remain barely even. U.S. whose financial markets are shaken and crash at the whim of financiers in Tokyo. The incompetent U.S. government is repeatedly outmaneuvered by clever Japanese bureaucrats who do not play by the rules of the game, but unfairly steal Americans' jobs by nurturing exports and shutting-out imports and then steal America's patrimony by buying American assets at fire-sale prices. You cannot avoid receiving such an impression from the pile-driver repetition of these seven points in LaFeber's prose.

But this has nothing to do with reality.

Reality: Economy-Wide Productivity

Begin with the broadest measure of economic productivity-- gross domestic product per worker. Translate different currencies into each other at the exchange rate that gives the best indication of relative price levels in different countries--the so-called purchasing-power-parity exchange rate. After all, if (measured at current exchange rates) one country's national product was twice as large but if its internal prices were twice as high, you would not say that it had a higher productivity level, would you? (Calculations at current exchange rates show the Japanese economy as somewhat bigger--but current exchange rate calculations undercount the economic weight of the United States because the United States has powerful economic advantages in its enormous endowment of land and natural resources, and its extremely productive service-producing sector. These economic advantages in non-tradeables lead the U.S. to have a purchasing-power-parity exchange rate considerably higher than current market exchange rates).

The figure immediately below shows our best estimates of purchasing power parity-concept GDP per worker in the U.S. and Japan since 1930. The figure below that shows relative income levels--Japanese purchasing power parity-concept GDP per worker as a percentage of the United States. The first thing to note is that U.S. economic growth is, as noted above, not weak. Moreover, also as noted above, there is substantial reason to believe that our standard statistics understate the productivity growth of the average worker and the consumption growth of the average household by about one percent per year.

The second thing to note from these figures is that in spite of all Japanese advantages--MITI and keiretsu and elite bureaucracy and not playing by the rules and public investment in research and development and its homogeneous population and its excellent secondary education system and all that--its GDP per worker is less than two-thirds that of the United States. The Japanese growth miracle of 1945 to 1990 was an amazing achievement, boosting Japanese productivity relative to American sevenfold. But it has been preceded by a disaster--World War II--that had cut Japanese productivity relative to American by two-thirds. It took until the very end of the 1960s for the Japanese economy to make up the relative ground that had been lost as a result of World War II.

The gap in productivity today remains large.

A diligent reader of LaFeber looking at these two figures would rub his or her eyes in disbelief. "How can this be?" he or she would ask. Japan has exploited the U.S. by not playing by free-trade rules; by provoking and winning clashes of increasing seriousness; by outmanoeuvering the incompetent American government; and by conquering foreign market after foreign market. U.S. industry after U.S. industry has succumbed to Japanese competition, as shown by the ever-rising U.S. trade deficit. And what Japanese exporters cannot win, Japanese financiers can: Americans now cut timber and catch fish for export to build houses and feed their Japanese bosses.

How can the U.S. have so much more productive an economy?

Reality: Japan's Dual Economy

We need to look at a more detailed picture. In 1993 the McKinsey Global Institute--a research organization affiliated with the McKinsey consulting group--published a study of manufacturing productivity by sector for nine selected sectors of industry in the U.S., German, and Japan. They found that in five of the sectors that they surveyed--steelmaking, auto parts manufacture, metalworking, auto assembly, and consumer electronics--that together accounted for 49 percent of surveyed employment that the average Japanese firm was more productive, in some cases by a large magnitude: the average Japanese steel manufacturer was nearly half again as productive as the average American.. They found that in four of the sectors--computer manufacture, soap and detergent, beer, and food processing--that together accounted for 51 percent of surveyed employment the average U.S. firm was more productive: in food processing the average Japanese firm was only one-third as productive as the average American firm.

The average of the surveyed sectors gave Japan an estimated average manufacturing productivity of only 83 percent of the U.S. Japan's edge in steelmaking, auto assembly, and consumer electronics was more than outweighed by the U.S. edge in food processing

Why this peculiar economic structure, in which Japanese productivity is world-class in some sectors, and far below first-world standards in others? Why this extraordinary lack of economic productivity in manufactures like food processing? And food processing is not unique. In other, non-manufacturing sectors--transportation and distribution, services, and agriculture--Japanese productivity is even further below the first-world standard.

Japanese Politics and Uneven Economic Performance

The answer is that Japan's extraordinarily low productivity in branches of economic activity outside of export-oriented manufacuturing is in large part due to its political order: the Liberal Democratic Party that has ruled Japan, and the elite bureaucrats that are so-often praised as the public-sector stewards of Japan's economic growth have striven mightily to keep Japanese agriculture, distribution, services, and non-export manufacturing unproductive. Prohibitions against the importation of rice boosted Japanese rice prices to seven times world levels. Thus large chunks of Japan's economic resources are devoted to growing rice on small, inefficient plots; a saner economic policy would have been to encourage faster migration out of agriculture, and to pay for rice imports by additional exports of manufactures--raising Japan's national income. Government bureaucrats believe that they have a mandate to protect existing stores against competition-- especially efficient competition from large-scale enterprises that would handle distribution more efficiently.

If the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has been diligently and successfully working to enrich Japan by boosting productivity in the export-oriented manufacturing sector, the rest of the Japanese governmental bureaucracy has been equally diligently and successfully working to make sure that the Japanese distribution sector and that Japanese agriculture remain inefficient and unproductive.

But wait--there's more. At the end of the 1980s the Japanese stock market and real estate markets fell by about fifty percent. As a result of these asset price declines, a lot of financial institutions were under water: the value of the assets they held and the collateral for the loans that they had issued were worth much less than the value of the deposits they had taken and their other liabilities. When large chunks of a financial sector find themselves in severe trouble--possibly insolvent--they hunker down: they call in what loans they can, they refuse to make new loans, they try to avoid extending credit to existing customers, and so forth.

In a modern market economy in which the continued flow of investment requires that the financial sector channel the flow of savings from households to businesses, such a pattern of behavior on the part of the financial sector is disastrous. It cripples domestic investment, and can lead to a Great Depression--unless cured through Keynesian-style stimulative economic policies.

For most of the past decade Japan's Ministry of Finance has refused to deal with the financial-sector problems created by the Japanese stock and real estate market declines. It has repeatedly vetoed serious attempts at Keynesian-style stimulative policies. It has taken no steps to recapitalize that banking sector so that the flow of financial capital can start up again.

The result has been a quiet depression: an economy that was growing at more than 4 percent per year in the 1980s has grown by less than 1 percent per year in the 1990s. By now Japanese GDP is at least a quarter lower than it would have been had the government taken successful steps to keep actual national product close to potential. Japanese social and labor market institutions have kept this quiet depression--so far--from showing up in mass unemployment. But by now Japan's quiet depression is nearly as deep as the Great Depression.

American economic policy makers have been urging the Japanese government to do something to get its economy moving again, with no success. American economic policy makers have been left scratching their heads, wondering how the Japanese government can have so completely forgotten the lessons about dealing with financial market-caused deflation taught by the Great Depression.

Thus is hard to take a look at the Japanese state as a whole--MOF as well as MITI, bureaucrats who control agriculture and forbid the opening of competitive stores as well as bureaucrats who channel research and development subsidies--and conclude that the Japanese government has been a net plus for the economic welfare of Japan. To the extent that Japanese government policies have been effective, they have pushed agricultural productivity and productivity in the distribution sector down by more than they have pushed export-oriented manufacturing productivity up. And their lack of response to the current quiet depression has robbed the Japanese people of as much as a quarter of their potential economic production.

The Value of U.S.-Japan Trade

Some of the smarter Japan-bashers in America today--James Fallows, for example--will admit that Japanese economic policies have been extraordinarily destructive of Japanese economic welfare. But, they go on to say, Japan's economic policy makers do not care about utility or consumer welfare or the national standard of living--it is a producer rather than a consumer economy, aimed at creating economic hegemony rather than enhancing human welfare.

The key point to grasp, they say, Japan's economic policies have harmed us as well. The U.S.-Japanese economic relationship as it has been conducted--by Japan's producer-oriented, consumer-ignoring developmental state and the U.S.'s incompetent government--has been a lose-lose relationship.

Has it?

In 1996 the United States exported some $70 billion worth of goods and services to Japan. Had trade with Japan been eliminated, and had those products been sold on the U.S. market--or, more likely, had the firms and workers who made them had to scramble to find jobs producing other commodities for which their would have been demand on the world market--those exported goods would have been worth perhaps $50 billion: a $20 billion gain in 1996 to U.S. real productivity from the availability of the Japanese export market.

In 1996 the United States imported some $115 billion worth of goods and services. Had we had to produce those goods and services here at home, we would have had to divert firms and workers who made perhaps $150 billion worth of other products: $35 billion gain in 1996 to U.S. real productivity from the availability of Japanese suppliers of imports.

Have Japanese imports crowded U.S. producers out of profitable industries? Have they kept U.S. firms from learning how to become more efficient producers by hindering their ability to learn how to use new technologies? Perhaps to some small extent. But there are more linkages going the other way: America's microprocessor and software industries benefit enormously from cheap computer parts from Japan that greatly boost total world demand for the products of America's leading economic sector.

But doesn't the U.S. government run a trade deficit with Japan? Doesn't the trade deficit destroy U.S. jobs? In a word, no. The level of employment in the United States is set in Washington DC, by the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee's decisions as it tries to balance the goals of full employment and low inflation. A large trade deficit can at times make the Federal Reserve's task a little harder, but at times it can make the Federal Reserve's task a little easier too. The view that a high level of U.S. employment depends on avoiding a trade deficit is false.

What, then, is the economic impact of the trade deficit? Of the approximately $45 billion trade deficit with Japan in 1996, about $15 billion was then transfered by Japan to other countries, that then used those $15 billion in dollars to buy U.S. exports--producing another $5 billion gain in 1996 to U.S. real productivity by boosting demand for exports and allowing us to employmore labor and capital in high-wage high-productivity export industries. The remaining $30 billion was invested in the United States: used to finance, directly and indirectly, the construction of buildings and the installation of machinery and equipment to boost productivity. The ability to make these extra $30 billion of investments was valuable and profitable to the U.S.: the capital put in place boosted productivity by perhaps $10 billion more than the cost of financing it.

Add all of these various gains-from-trade up, and discover that the existence of the Japanese market boosted American real productivity in 1996 by some $70 billion--by one percent. The country would have been a full one percent poorer in 1996 if not for the existence of Japan as a supplier and a customer.

Now one percent of national product is not an overwhelmingly large number by the standards of the U.S. economy as a whole. To put it in perspective, the standard estimates of the cost to the U.S. economy of running the large budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s range from two to six percent of GDP-- roughly four times as large as all of our gains-from-trade with Japan. But it is a noticeable quantity: the U.S.-Japan trading relationship is an important national asset.

Could it be more valuable? Are Japanese governmental policies reducing the value of the trading relationship? Yes, they are. Japanese barriers to imports cause significant reductions in the value of U.S.-Japan trade, and in the benefits that both countries derive from it.

But the fact that we wish the benefits from the relationship were larger, and are annoyed at the Japanese governments for pursuing policies that reduce the value of the relationship to us--and even more to them--does not mean that it is not a valuable relationship, or one whose most important aspect is some "clash" between two different varieties of capitalism.

Why Does LaFeber Go So Far Wrong?

So why does LaFeber paint so different a picture from the one that I do?

The answer is not that he is a stupid man or a bad historian-- although a number of the sources that he relies on are stupid, mendacious, or bought.

The answer is that he trusts the wrong sources, and reads the wrong documents. Government archives--and news reports--are full of threats of retaliatory duties, disputes over subsidies to export industries, and declarations from those whose economic position is harmed by rising imports that allowing such imports is not in the national interest. That is the knowledge base he uses to write his book.

Appearing nowhere in the files of governments, or in the reports of news organizations, or in white papers produced by think-tanks funded by import-fearing textile barons is the satisfaction of a U.S. consumer who has just bought a SONY walkman, the happiness of a processed-foods exporter who has just landed a large contract from a Japanese importer, the extra cheapness with which a building can be constructed using Komatsu earth-moving equipment, or the lower taxes allowed by the reduced interest on the national debt because some of it is held by Japanese investors. So LaFeber does not write about the gains from imports for American consumers, or the benefits from exports, or the benefits from Japanese investments in the United States.

Given Walter LaFeber's sources, he is like a man trying to reconstruct a redwood tree from detailed chemical analyses of its leaves. He not only cannot see the forest for the trees, he is unaware that there might ever be such a thing as a forest.

Another reason is LaFeber's own lack of proper intellectual training. He writes a 500-page book about U.S.-Japanese relations, focusing largely on international trade. His book has index entries for Angola, Benjamin Franklin, Frank Capra, Elijah Muhammed, the Kishinev Pogrom of 1903, George Orwell, J. Edgar Hoover, Herman Melville, Orson Welles, and many other people and events of doubtful relevance to U.S.-Japanese relations. But it has no index entry for Okawa Kazushi, Henry Rosovsky, David Ricardo, Adam Smith, Paul Samuelson (or any other economist--Japan development specialist, international trade expert, or not--save John Kenneth Galbraith, cited in a context far removed from that of international trade; John Maynard Keynes, cited as a possible influence on the economic policies of Takahashi Korekiyo's in Japan between 1931 and 1936; and George Shultz, cited for his views as Secretary of State).

When the works of James Fallows and Clyde Prestowitz are as close to the works of economists as you get, you should not be surprised if you get the economics horribly wrong.

Now LaFeber could have done a better job. Adam Smith's devastation of mercantilism two and a quarter centuries ago in his Wealth of Nations remains a devastating a critique of Fallows and Prestowitz. David Ricardo's doctrine of comparative advantage should be a key part of the toolkit of anyone writing about international economic relations, as should the Stolper-Samuelson analysis of how expanding international trade affects the domestic distribution of income. Moreover, people who have happily purchased Japanese products, been employed at better-paying jobs because of export demand from Japan, or had their wages boosted because their productivity was multiplied by Japan-financed investment are not hard to find at all.

But he didn't. And he didn't because he is used to reading the Foreign Relations of the United States rather than the National Income and Product Accounts, because of his own intellectual limitations which close off from his gaze the entire literature of economics, and for another reason: that he comes out of a tradition focuses on dominance on leadership, on power understood as relative to other actors. There is an opposed tradition: one in which power is seen as the ability to get things done rather than as the ability to dominate others. It is kind of like the difference between reporting only the winners of the race and reporting the times of the different contestants. But to start, as Walter LaFeber does, with the relative power question--"who is on top?"--is to take a step on a path that can lead you far, far away from what is truly interesting and important.

Thus it is not surprising that his book is a book about "the clash."

Perception and Reality

At the start of my discussion of LaFeber's book, I claimed that it had reality and illusion inverted: what it took to be illusion--the mutually-beneficial economic partnership between the U.S. and Japan--was the reality; what it took to be reality--"the clash"--was just illusion, constructed by ignoring the forest and gazing not even at the trees but at individual leaves.

I lied.

In the world of history and politics, perceptions are never "just illusion." Perceptions can have a frightening solidity as they shape people's beliefs and people act on them. During 1941 the Japanese armed forces and foreign relations establishment perceived a United States intent on destroying Japanese power; by their actions in December 1941 they created the United States that they had feared.

The reality of U.S.-Japanese relations today is a reality of mutually-beneficial economic partnership. We buy goods in which they have a comparative advantage. They buy goods in which we have a comparative advantage (not as much of them as they should in an ideal world--but the losses accrue largely to Japanese consumers). Japanese capital helps fund investment in the U.S. that boosts productivity by more than the cost of the hired resources.

The belief that the core of U.S.-Japanese relations today is a clash between incompatible forms of capitalism is an illusion.

But if enough people believe in it--if Walter LaFeber and others have their way--than this illusion will acquire substance. Because journalists, officials, and others believe that there is a clash, there will be a clash. And the mutual benefits from the economic relationship may be sacrificed, especially if those who try hard to prserve the gains from trade are denounced as "suckers waiting to be manipulated from the word go" (p. 392).


Japan plays the U.S. for a sucker by refusing to play by the free-trade rules of the game. This theme starts the very beginning of the chapter, and continues throughout. Time magazine declares "Japan does not follow the gentlemanly rules" on international trade (p. 359); "U.S. officials shoutened and threatened, but... Tokyo's unelected administrators stayed true to course, and why not?" (p. 384); "Clinton stumbled... his administration feared any breakdown of trade talks with Japan--a fear Japanese bureaucrats fully exploited" (p. 392); "Hashimoto succeeded in getting an agreement in which Japan gave little away... as for Clinton's mini-industrial policy... the U.S.... had no comprehensive long-term goals or sense of priorities" (p. 393).

The seriousness of the clash between Japan and the U.S. is always increasing. At the start of the chapter the U.S. and Japan head for "a series of clashes that marked the 1971-74 era as a turning point in the partnership" (p. 359); then the traumas of the oil crisis and Watergate "sharpened the American-Japanese conflict" (p. 361); the "U.S.-Japan relationship... [already] souring in 1971 grew even more bitter (p. 361); "intensifying U.S.-Japan clashes seemed predictable" (p. 363); "[Even though the] U.S. ambassador to Japan... emphasize[d] that 'the U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the world... [and] one million Japanese tourists arrived annually... because of the language barrier and group traveling, few new bridges resulted to link the two cultures" (p. 363); "Carter's confusion quickly afflicted U.S.-Japan relations.... [The U.S.] troops remained [in Korea]. But doubts had been sown" (p. 364); "the 1980s opened and closed with crises in U.S.-Japan relations" (p. 370); "the relationship showed signs of improving... {Prime Minister] Nakosone "quickly moved to a 'Ron-Yasu' relationship with Reagan... [however] technology... mostly moved one-way: westward" (pp. 371-3); by "1987 [Japan's] foreign minister... lamented that the U.S.-Japan trade relationship 'is at its worst since the war'" (p. 380); "Japan's coming to terms with its new international role did not mean it was coming to terms with the United States. The clash with the Americans instead intensified" (p. 389); "did the post-1945 U.S.-Japan relationship already exist on a life-support system?" (p. 395).

The American government is incompetent, while the Japanese government is very, very competent. In America the response to the oil crisis was "badly managed" (p. 361); in Japan although policies to deal with the oil crisis "seemed quite out of step with some western views... the 'mix' produced a continuing [economic] 'miracle'" (pp. 362-3); "a fragmented U.S. political system could not pull itself together" (p. 379); "the problem was not quantitative trade figures, but qualitative policies: the keiretsu and the bureaucracy had created a very different system from the American" (p. 373); Tokyo's "administrators' long-term policies... seemed to be putting Japan into an excellent position for competition in the twenty-first century" (p. 384); "Japan.. had created one of the most powerful, well-financed lobbies in Washington [but]... a pro-American lobby had no chance of operating successfully in Tokyo" (p. 394).

The U.S. "loses" foreign market after market to ferocious Japanese competitors. "Japanese banks and their keiretsu (networks) in big industry were mounting an all-out assault on Southeast Asian and Chinese markets" (p. 365); "the Japanese moved to control the burgeoning Southeast Asian and Chinese markets" (p. 366); "the concentrated firepower of the keidenren's banking-industrial complex made Japan (to use Orwell's phrase) more than equal [in the race for the China market]" (p. 368); Japan was "quietly replacing the U.S. as the key partner in the development of East Asia" (p. 390).

Domestic industry after industry falls to the tide of Japanese imports--which devastate the American economy. "Carter trumpeted a three-year plan to save Detroit's auto industry... but... Chrysler nearly went bankrupt... the entire U.S. auto industry stumbled through the 1980s while Japanese models controlled 30 percetn of the America market" (p. 366); "when Japan seemed to be falling behind in the semiconductor industry, pivotal in the onrushing computerization of the globe, the government ensured tax breaks and subsidies for a Research Association.... [which] pooled research efforts between 1976 and 1979 to develop patents that brought Japan up with the U.S. computer industry, [meanwhile] Americans were meanwhile left knocking on Japan's door, their technology either coopted or excluded" (p. 365); "North Americans... were to provide raw materials for Japan's machines.... the 'question is whether we want to become a banana republic' a California electronics manufacturer declared in 1978" (p. 369); "anti-Japanese feelings rose among workers in lumber, fisheries, and electronics" (p. 369); "the American economy was devastated by a deadly inflation and 18 percent interest rates" (p. 371); "most of the U.S. research went into the military (50.8 percent compared with 4.9 percent in Japan) [while] the Japanese put 60 percent into industry, agriculture, energy, and infrastructure" (p. 374); the U.S. "pressured Japan to slash its exports... in cotton textiles, steel, televisions, automobiles, semiconductors, and machine tools" (p. 374); "the U.S. economy stagnated... millions of Americans found their jobs endangered by reduced defense budgets--and rising tides of Japanese products" (p. 381);

America's economic decline is clearly visible in the rising trade deficit. In the 1980s, America's "trade deficit with Japan soared toward $50 billion" (p. 371); American and Japanese "economic systems were moving not toward cooperation but full-throated competition" (p. 373); "the strong dollar drove up the prices of U.S. exports, thus creating a historic trade deficit... [and leading] Tokyo and Washington... [to] search for a quick fix.... [But] accepted economic theory seemed irrelevant to the realities of Japanese trade policies... Despite the Plaza agreement [to lower the value of the dollar], U.S. exports to Japanese markets rose only 5.5 percent, but Japan's exports to Americans jumped 21 percent... Reagan and Baker had been blindsided by Japan" (pp. 375-6);

When the Japanese cannot conquer by trade, they conquer by purchase. "Japanese firms had invested $25 billion in the United States, one-third of it in the West where they exploited forests and fisheries for exports back to Japan" (p.369); "the Japanese found themselves in a win-win situation... as the yen ballooned in value, Japanese investors gobbled up prize manufacturing and real estate assets at seemingly bargain-basement prices" (p. 367); "a most awesome display of Japan's power occurred in October 1987... [the 1987] 'crash... started and stopped in Tokyo'" (p. 378); "Japanese invested an incredible $650 billion abroad, with nearly half going to the United States... Tokyo investors bought such jewels as... Rockefeller Center... leading Hollywood studios... Pebble Beach, perhaps the nation's most beautiful golf course" (p. 378); "of the world's ten biggest banks, nine--perhaps ten--were Japanese (p. 378);



Created 11/17/1997
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Professor of Economics J. Bradford DeLong, 601 Evans
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